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Class in New Zealand
Past, present and future
Patrick Ongley
IN THE WAKE of the global financial crisis and amidst a tide of concern about inequality, now is an opportune time to revisit the topic of class. It is conspicuously absent from most of the 
discourse surrounding the current state of capitalism and its 
iniquities, but it is critical to a full understanding of them. In New 
Zealand, we have always tended to shy away from talk of class, 
but like all capitalist societies this is a class society, and we are all 
connected to and divided from others by class relations. Class also 
connects our present to our past and future, playing key roles in the 
periodic economic and social transformations shaping our history. 
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New Zealand has been through at least three such transitions, 
which have all involved significant shifts in class relations and class 
structures. At this current uncertain juncture in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, we may have the opportunity to forge 
another transformation.
What is class and why does it matter?
Raise the subject of social class with most New Zealanders and 
you are unlikely to arouse the passions. Most do not consider class 
to be a significant element of their own identities or an important 
dimension of New Zealand society. This owes much to our historical 
ideal of egalitarianism, which – however spuriously – has portrayed 
this as a country of opportunity where class inequalities are less 
marked and class boundaries less rigid than elsewhere. Today the 
myth of egalitarianism may be challenged by a growing awareness of 
material inequalities, but these inequalities are seldom interpreted 
in class terms.1 In fact, the growth of inequality in recent times 
has probably coincided with a diminishing of class awareness and 
identification, reflecting economic and social changes of the last 
few decades: the decline of manual working-class jobs and collective 
organisation among workers, greater mobilisation around non-
class differences such as ethnicity and gender, and increasingly 
individualised and fragmented patterns of social differentiation. 
While surveys suggest most New Zealanders recognise the 
existence of class, they have differing understandings about what 
the term actually means, and the overwhelming majority (as many 
as 75 to 90 percent depending on the survey) consider themselves 
to be middle class – including many working in what sociologists 
would generally categorise as working-class occupations.2 
Presumably the results might be somewhat different if people were 
asked to categorise others rather than themselves, but even so if the 
vast majority identify with the same class it is unlikely that class 
divisions will figure strongly in our consciousness. 
1  See for instance Max Rashbrooke, ed., Inequality, Wellington 2013. 
2  Edward Haddon, ‘Class identification in New Zealand’, Journal of 
Sociology 51/3 2015, pp. 737–54; Joanne Black, ‘Show a Bit of Class’, 
New Zealand Listener, 28 May 2005, pp. 16–21. The figures cited are an 
aggregation of the categories of ‘upper middle class’, ‘middle class’ and 
‘lower middle class’.
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However, this does not mean that class is of no consequence 
in New Zealand. Like all capitalist societies, this is a class society 
in that it is characterised by structural inequalities based on the 
control of resources which are economically, socially and politically 
advantageous. The extent to which such inequalities engender class 
consciousness and class formation – the development of collective 
awareness and the potential for collective action among people in 
similar class situations – depends on how people experience and 
respond to the realities of class inequality in particular times and 
places. In New Zealand, class consciousness and class formation 
have been constrained by a number of historical factors: the 
ideological influence of the egalitarian ideal; the relative openness 
of settler societies to social mobility and cross-class interactions; 
the overshadowing of class divisions by those between Māori and 
Pākehā; the delayed and constrained development of large-scale 
industry and an industrial working class; and the mitigating 
effects of mass consumption, sustained by the wage growth of 
the post-1945 era and the consumer credit of more recent times. 
However, we will see later that at certain points in New Zealand’s 
history – particularly in times of economic crisis – class divisions 
have come more into focus and mobilisation around class interests 
has played a critical role in determining the course of the country’s 
development.
Before looking at that story, some clarification of the concept 
of class is necessary. Class is an idea which lends itself to a variety 
of meanings, including differences of social status, hierarchies of 
socio-economic inequality, relations of exploitation, and imbalances 
of power. This complicates both the popular discourse about class 
and the academic field of class analysis, which is beset with arcane 
and protracted debates about how class should be conceptualised 
and analysed – debates which often come down to different 
understandings of what class means.3 The dominant strands of 
sociological thinking on class are those inspired by Marx, Weber, 
and more recently Pierre Bourdieu. For Marxists, class is about 
exploitative economic relations based in the sphere of production 
which entail conflicting interests and generate collective struggles 
3  For overviews of the field see Rosemary Crompton, Class and 
Stratification, 3rd ed., Cambridge 2008; Erik Olin Wright, ed., Approaches 
to Class Analysis, Cambridge 2005.
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in pursuit of those interests. Weberians are concerned with how 
different market capacities affect people’s life chances, how this 
constrains individual and inter-generational social mobility, and 
how it leads to the formation of social classes cohering around 
shared economic class situations. The Bourdieusian perspective is 
influenced by both Marx and Weber, but instead of locating class in 
production or the market, it focuses on how people actively create 
class through practices of social inclusion and exclusion based on 
the possession of different types of capital: cultural, social and 
symbolic as well as economic.4 
These schools of thought and others tend to be regarded as 
competing perspectives, but some argue it might be more fruitful 
to view them as complementary, with each having the capacity to 
inform different research agendas and illuminate different aspects 
of the multifaceted subject of class.5 In sympathy with this view, 
I favour a broadly Marxist approach, but one which incorporates 
elements of both Weberian and Bourdieusian thinking.6 This 
means starting from a Marxist standpoint that holds class 
inequalities are fundamentally rooted in production relations, and 
that the antagonisms generated by these relations are critical to 
understanding the dynamics of capitalism. But drawing on Weber 
it also recognises that people’s positions in production relations 
depend on their market capacities – in particular the skills they 
possess – and that the degree of social mobility in a given society 
affects the likelihood of class formation. And following Bourdieu, it 
recognises that class formation is not exclusively a manifestation 
of economic relations, but that cultural and social capital play 
important roles in the generation and reproduction of class 
distinctions and inequalities. 
4  Cultural capital refers to socially valued knowledge, tastes and 
dispositions; social capital refers to social connections and networks; and 
symbolic capital refers to prestige or status. Economic and cultural capital 
are the most important resources in Bourdieu’s conception of class.  
5  Crompton, Class and Stratification; Erik Olin Wright, ‘Conclusion: If 
“Class” Is the Answer, What Is the Question?’, in Wright, ed., Approaches 
to Class Analysis.
6  What follows is a necessarily brief summation of a position elaborated 
more fully in Patrick Ongley, ‘Reshaping the Division of Labour: Work and 
Class in New Zealand Since the 1980s’, Unpublished PhD thesis, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2011, pp. 130–162.
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In keeping with the theme of this journal, we can usefully 
view class from the perspective of connections, as class is one of the 
fundamental axes by which people are connected to and divided 
from others. In the Marxist tradition, and in the sociology of class 
more generally, classes are not discrete hierarchical categories, but 
groups which are defined in relationship to each other. For Marx, 
the fundamental class relationship in capitalism was between 
capital and labour – between owners and non-owners of the means 
of production.  This was an exploitative relationship in that the 
economic prosperity of those who employed the labour power of 
others came at the expense of those who provided the labour. It was 
also a dynamic relationship in that it was the source of struggles 
over conflicting interests which would shape the development of 
capitalism and eventually bring about its demise. In this sense, 
the class relationship connects not only capital and labour but 
also past, present and future. Marx’s contention that ‘the history 
of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ 
may be somewhat sweeping and reductionist, but it does highlight 
the role of class struggles in the emergence of capitalism and 
anticipates the role capital–labour relations have played in shaping 
its development since Marx’s time. As we will see shortly in the 
New Zealand context, capitalist societies have developed through a 
succession of different economic and institutional models shaped by 
the interplay of class interests and involving shifts in the balance of 
capital–labour relations. While the capital–labour relation does not 
explain everything about capitalism, we cannot reach an adequate 
understanding of the history or current configuration of capitalism 
without it.
While Marx focussed on the relationship between capital 
and labour, he acknowledged the existence of other intermediate 
and transitional classes, and the fragmentation of interests 
within classes. However, these divisions were secondary to the 
fundamental divide between capital and labour, and would not 
prevent society polarising into ‘two great hostile camps’ with the 
progressive concentration of capital and immiseration of labour. 
Contrary to this expectation, capital ownership in fact became 
more dispersed with the development of joint stock companies, 
and labour became more fragmented with increasingly complex 
and hierarchical divisions of labour. While the capital–labour 
relation remained the defining feature of the capitalist mode of 
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production, the ground between the ‘hostile camps’ was occupied by 
a proliferating middle class as the ‘old middle class’ of independent 
producers and merchants (the ‘petty bourgeoisie’) was joined by a 
burgeoning ‘new middle class’ of salaried managers, professionals 
and other white-collar workers who neither owned the means of 
production nor identified with the industrial working class.  
Changes in class structure and their implications for 
class consciousness and class struggle became the subject of much 
attention from Marxist scholars, particularly in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Of these, arguably the most convincing 
and influential has been Erik Olin Wright.7 Wright conceptualises 
middle-class or intermediate positions as contradictory or 
privileged locations within class relations. These relations are still 
centred on ownership of the means of production, which gives us the 
three basic categories of capitalists, workers and petty bourgeois 
(owners who don’t exploit labour). But Wright additionally identifies 
contradictory or privileged positions among non-owners based on 
levels of authority and expertise (or skill). The higher workers rank 
on these axes, the more power they have over other workers (in the 
case of managers) and the greater the share of the surplus they 
can claim in the form of higher remuneration (in the case of both 
managers and professionals). These three criteria of ownership, 
authority and expertise can be used to differentiate a variable 
number of class locations for different research purposes. 
Importantly, these categories are described as class 
locations (or locations within class relations) rather than actual 
classes. Class locations – which together constitute a class 
structure – are sets of objective positions in production relations, 
which do not necessarily represent either actual or latent social 
classes with a shared consciousness and the capacity for collective 
action. Contrary to the traditional Marxist view, Wright does not 
presume that people in similar locations in the class structure will 
inevitably develop a class consciousness which will duly result in 
class action to advance their interests (as in the transition of a 
‘class in itself’ to a ‘class for itself’). Rather, he sees class structure 
7  Wright’s position has evolved over a long period. The following is based 
on his later work, especially Erik Olin Wright, Class Counts, Cambridge 
1997.
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as constraining the possibilities for class formation, meaning that 
shared consciousness and organisation are more likely to occur 
among people in proximate class locations who share similar 
conditions of existence and material interests. The extent to which 
that occurs is not a matter for theoretical supposition but depends 
on human agency in specific local and historical circumstances.8 
Here, Wright’s perspective can be usefully complemented 
by Weberian and Bourdieusian insights to show that class 
formation is not just based on awareness of common economic 
interests, but also has strong social and cultural dimensions. The 
Weberian perspective highlights that class formation is more likely 
to occur where there is low social mobility and people therefore 
have a continuity of association with particular class locations over 
time, possibly over several generations. And Bourdieu shows that 
class formation also involves practices of symbolic classification, 
whereby people establish their affinity with or distance from others 
on the basis of cultural distinctions manifested in consumption and 
lifestyle. These social and cultural dimensions of class can enhance 
people’s sense of connection with others in similar class locations 
and their sense of difference from those in disparate class locations, 
thereby increasing the possibilities for class consciousness and 
class mobilisation in the Marxist sense. 
The possibilities for class formation also depend on the 
strength of other cross-cutting forms of social differentiation, 
particularly gender and ethnicity. Because capitalism has 
historically utilised the labour of women and colonised, enslaved 
8  Although in broad agreement with Wright’s position, I do use the term 
‘class’ to refer to aggregations of people in similar class locations in order 
to avoid more cumbersome terminology, but this does not assume anything 
about the extent of class formation within these categories. Applying 
Wright’s criteria of ownership, authority and expertise, I use a simple 
three-class distinction between a capitalist class (who own or control 
the means of production), a middle class (owners who work on their own 
account and non-owners in managerial or professional positions), and a 
working class (non-owners in non-managerial and sub-professional jobs). 
These categories refer to people engaged in production relations, while 
others will have indirect attachments to class locations based on either 
their previous employment (retired or jobless workers), their current 
prospects (tertiary students or new jobseekers), or the class location of their 
‘breadwinner’ (dependent children or spouses).
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or migrant ethnic groups for certain types of work (both paid and 
unpaid), and because the ideological legitimations for this have 
persisted to some extent, these groups have become concentrated in 
particular positions within production relations. But people of the 
same gender or ethnicity do not all share the same class position – 
they are divided by class, just as classes are divided by gender and 
ethnicity. Inequality in capitalism is multi-dimensional, and people 
may experience multiple disadvantages, or may be in contradictory 
positions, disadvantaged in some respects and advantaged in 
others. This inevitably means some fracturing of the commonalities 
of class. The experiences and subjectivities of working-class Pākehā 
men, for instance, may be quite different from those of working-
class Māori women. And in situations where gender and ethnicity 
are more significant than class in shaping people’s material 
circumstances and identities, this may diminish the possibilities 
for class consciousness and class formation. But again, the extent to 
which this occurs cannot be theoretically determined: the ways in 
which class, gender and ethnicity inter-relate will vary in different 
contexts.
The sense that class consciousness and class formation 
have diminished in developed capitalist societies has stimulated 
considerable debate about the ‘death of class’.9 Some commentators 
and theorists contend that economic and socio-cultural changes 
have rendered class largely irrelevant as a basis for individual 
identity, social differentiation and collective organisation. 
Economically, the fragmentation of the great classes of capital 
and labour, the decline of industrial production and the industrial 
working class, and increasing insecurity and transience in 
employment are said to have eroded the bases of traditional class 
identities and allegiances. It is also argued that these changes have 
been accompanied by socio-cultural shifts which have increased 
the salience of non-class differences such as gender and ethnicity, 
and reflexive individualised identities based on consumption and 
lifestyle rather than economic situations. Much of the criticism 
of class theory has been associated with a rejection of Marxism 
and what is seen as its outmoded pre-occupation with class. This 
9  Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, The Death of Class, London 1996; 
Paul Kingston, The Classless Society, Stanford CA 2000; David Lee and 
Bryan Turner, eds., Conflicts About Class, London 1996.
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includes post-Marxist thinkers who eschew Marxism’s orthodox 
focus on the working class – particularly the industrial proletariat 
– as an agent of emancipatory struggle, in favour of more pluralistic 
understandings of the antagonisms within capitalism and sites of 
anti-capitalist resistance.10
While there is undoubtedly some justification for arguing 
that class has changed in character and declined in significance, 
it is something of a leap to say that class is dead or no longer of 
any relevance. Class structures and composition have changed; 
patterns of social differentiation have become more complex and 
multi-dimensional; and class consciousness and collective action 
have diminished. But there is plenty of empirical evidence to show 
that class still matters in people’s lives – in terms of relations in 
the workplace, material wellbeing, life chances, patterns of social 
affiliation and political orientations.11 More widely, the conflicting 
interests of capital and labour continue to generate collective 
struggles over economic resources and political power. To say that 
class matters is not to attribute it with any primacy over other forms 
of social differentiation or to say that it necessarily matters more 
than other axes of inequality such as gender or ethnicity. Rather, it 
is to recognise that class remains an important dimension among 
multi-dimensional relations of exploitation, domination and conflict 
within capitalism. Class will continue to matter as long as there 
are material inequalities deriving from relations of production and 
divisions of labour. And given the growth and entrenchment of such 
inequalities over recent times, it remains particularly relevant 
today.
The past: a brief history of class before neoliberalism
When it comes to looking at the realities of class in New Zealand, 
we are somewhat constrained by the lack of empirical research 
10  Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
2nd ed., London 2001; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude, New 
York 2004.
11  Erik Olin Wright, Understanding Class, London 2015, pp. 139–156; 
John Scott, ‘Social Class and Stratification in Late Modernity’, Acta 
Sociologica 45/1 2002, pp. 23–35.
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on the topic. The low profile of class in the popular imagination 
is reflected in a lack of significant interest from academics and 
researchers – particularly in recent years.12 This means we have 
little robust evidence of the extent of class-based inequalities, 
the lived experience of class and the subjective dimensions of 
class formation. We can, however, construct a broad narrative of 
the development of class relations and class structures and their 
implications for class formation, and from this discern the ways in 
which class connects us to each other and to our past and future. 
Class relations in contemporary New Zealand resemble 
those in most other developed western capitalist nations, 
particularly those where employment is concentrated in services 
rather than production and where neoliberal economic and 
institutional models prevail. However, the course New Zealand has 
followed to this point is somewhat distinctive owing to its colonial 
history and agricultural foundations – having more in common 
with other settler societies than with the industrial homelands of 
Europe. The course of capitalist development in New Zealand, as 
elsewhere, has been one of both incremental change and periodic 
upheavals. Incremental change has been driven by the expansion 
and rationalisation of capitalist production – increases in the scale 
of production and consumption, commodification of more and more 
goods and services, and development of the forces of production 
through new technologies and labour processes. During the course 
of this evolution there have also been periods of more abrupt and 
acute upheaval, when capitalism’s periodic crises have prompted 
significant economic restructuring and institutional reform. Such 
episodes of crisis and renewal usher in new phases in the histories of 
capitalist economies – or new modes of development, characterised 
by important shifts in the nature of production and regulation, and 
consequently in class structures and class relations.13 
 
12  For a review of the literature see Charles Crothers, ‘The New Zealand 
Literature on Social Class/Inequality’, New Zealand Sociology 28/3 2013, 
pp: 255–89.
13  This perspective is broadly derived from regulation theory. See Robert 
Boyer and Yves Saillard, eds., Régulation Theory, London 2002; Bob Jessop 
and Ngai-Ling Sum, Beyond the Regulation Approach, Cheltenham 2006.
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We can identify four distinct periods in New Zealand’s 
economic history, separated by major crises in the 1880s, 1930s 
and 1970s. These were all global crises which had major effects on 
New Zealand due to our integration in global networks of trade and 
finance. The responses to each of those crises gave rise to new modes 
of development which mirrored shifts in other capitalist economies, 
while also following distinctive paths based on local circumstances 
and the outcomes of local struggles between class interests. Today 
we are mired in the aftermath of another global crisis which may 
yet prove to be a catalyst for a new transformation. As yet that does 
not seem imminent, but history suggests this could be a pivotal 
moment. 
Origins: 1840–1890
The colonial period laid the foundations for the development of 
capitalism in New Zealand. In Marxist terms, this was a period of 
primitive accumulation, in which the pre-conditions for capitalist 
production were established through appropriation of Māori land 
by various means and the creation of a class of wage labourers 
from the ranks of landless immigrants and some dispossessed 
Māori. The New Zealand Company sought to replicate the class 
relations of Britain by pricing land at a level beyond the reach 
of most immigrants, thereby compelling them to work for wages 
before they could afford to buy land, while also using the proceeds 
of land sales to fund further immigration of workers, thus ensuring 
capital had an adequate supply of labour.14 Wage labour was 
required not only for agriculture but also for industries servicing 
the agricultural sector and the growing settler society: public works 
projects which opened up land and developed infrastructure; small-
scale processing and manufacturing operations which supplied 
local markets with producer and consumer goods; and mercantile, 
transport and financial services which facilitated circulation of 
goods and capital.15 While much of this activity was performed 
14  A plan described with grudging admiration by Marx (Capital, Volume 
1, Harmondsworth 1976, pp. 931–940).
15  W.J. Gardner, ‘A Colonial Economy’, in Geoffrey Rice, ed., The Oxford 
History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., Auckland 1992; Jim McAloon, ‘The New 
Zealand Economy, 1792-1914’, in Giselle Byrnes, ed., The New Oxford 
History of New Zealand, Melbourne 2009.
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by capitalist enterprises employing wage labour, there was also 
significant petty-commodity production by small farmers, miners, 
traders and storekeepers who utilised only their own labour and 
sometimes that of unpaid family members. 
By the late nineteenth century we therefore had the 
emergence of a nascent class structure consisting of a politically 
dominant capitalist class of large landowners, merchants and 
financiers; a middle class mainly comprising petty-commodity 
producers along with relatively small numbers of managerial and 
professional workers; and a numerically predominant working 
class of manual labourers in agriculture, construction and 
manufacturing, along with non-manual wage-earners in urban 
service industries and domestic service – the latter being the main 
form of employment for women.16 It is difficult to gauge the degree 
of class formation in colonial New Zealand. Despite the relatively 
open nature of settler society, class boundaries still marked 
important differences of culture and status.17 However, working-
class consciousness and collective organisation seem to have been 
relatively low, no doubt reflecting the distinctive circumstances 
of settler colonialism.18 Settlers generally aspired to better their 
situation not through collective organisation with fellow workers 
but by acquiring their own land or businesses, and there was a 
sense that this was possible in a society with a more egalitarian 
ethos and less rigid social boundaries than Britain. The fostering of 
collective consciousness and organisation was in any case difficult 
in a frontier society where much of the labour force was transient 
and/or dispersed across small enterprises in rural areas and small 
towns. While unions for skilled tradespeople began to form in the 
16  Because of differences in social status between manual and non-
manual workers at this time, the latter are often categorised by historians 
and sociologists as middle class, and may well have regarded themselves 
as such. However, in terms of their objective positions within production 
relations there is no substantial difference between low-skilled white-collar 
and blue-collar workers.
17  James Belich, Making Peoples, Auckland 1996, pp. 313–337.
18  This has led some historians to downplay the significance of class in 
colonial New Zealand, but others have argued that class divisions were 
nonetheless very real. See Erik Olssen, ‘The Working Class’, New Zealand 
Journal of History, 8 1974, pp. 44–60; Jim McAloon, ‘Class in Colonial New 
Zealand’, New Zealand Journal of History, 38 2004, pp. 3–21.
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1860s and for semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the 1870s, 
their coverage and strength was limited.19
Class divisions were brought more into focus with the 
onset of the Long Depression which lasted from the late 1870s to 
the early 1890s and like subsequent crises was felt most severely 
by working people. The depression brought rising unemployment, 
deteriorations in working conditions (including sweated factory 
labour) and growing economic hardship for workers. It also brought 
increasing levels of unionisation and industrial action – including 
the country’s first major industrial dispute in the Maritime 
Strike of 1890. And it eventually brought about the election of the 
country’s first great reforming government, the Liberals, whose 
broad constituency included significant working-class support. 
Consolidation: 1890–1935
The reform programme of the Liberals launched the next stage of 
capitalist development in New Zealand, based on consolidation of 
the pastoral economy and economic dependence on Britain as the 
major export market and source of finance capital. While the Liberals 
were not a class-based party, their labour and land reforms did 
seek to redress imbalances in class relationships which threatened 
economic development.20 The labour reforms were partly motivated 
by concerns about the iniquities of an unregulated labour market, 
but also sought to minimise disruptive conflict between capital and 
labour. They gave the state a more active role in mediating capital–
labour relations, first by regulating working conditions and then by 
centralising bargaining and dispute resolution under the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894, which encouraged 
unionisation of workers while also restricting their ability to take 
industrial action.21 
 
19  John Deeks, Jane Parker, and Rose Ryan, Labour and Employment 
Relations in New Zealand, 2nd ed., Auckland 1994, pp. 35–39.
20  Len Richardson, ‘Parties and Political Change’, in Geoffrey Rice, ed., 
The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., Auckland 1992.
21  Deeks et al, Labour and Employment Relations in New Zealand, pp. 
39–48.
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Meanwhile, land reforms sought to break up large estates 
and encourage smaller-scale intensive farming, favouring small 
capitalist and petty-commodity producers at the expense of large 
landholders who had tied up much of the productive land during 
the colonial period. It also came at the expense of Māori, who had 
more of their land appropriated for capitalist production and faced 
further economic marginalisation. The development of refrigerated 
shipping gave more impetus to small-scale intensive farming, 
allowing the export of meat and dairy products in addition to the 
previous staple of wool. This in turn stimulated an expanding 
and increasingly specialised social division of labour surrounding 
agricultural production, including primary product processing 
industries, producer and consumer service industries, and a 
growing public sector.22 
With the expansion of capitalist production, population 
growth and urbanisation, the settler society became a settled 
society and the nascent class structure of the colonial period 
consolidated, but with some important shifts between and within 
the major class groupings. The capitalist class was still dominated 
by the allied interests of farmers, merchants and financiers, but 
the power of large landowners declined, while the interests of 
industrial capital were held in abeyance.23 Meanwhile the middle 
class expanded considerably, mainly due to growth in the ‘new 
middle class’ of urban managers and professionals, while the 
‘old middle class’ of petty-commodity producers was bolstered by 
growing numbers of small farmers, but otherwise declined as larger 
capitalist enterprises became more dominant. Despite middle-class 
growth, the working class remained numerically predominant, 
while also becoming more urbanised and more diverse. Farm 
labour was increasingly displaced by owner-occupied farming and 
mechanisation, but new jobs emerged in processing and other 
secondary industries in towns and cities, along with significant 
growth in white-collar employment, particularly in clerical and 
22  Tom Brooking, ‘Economic Transformation’, in Geoffrey Rice, ed., The 
Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., Auckland 1992.
23  Warwick Armstrong, ‘New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and Uneven 
Development’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 14/3 
1978, pp. 297–303.
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retail work, and particularly among women.24 
Urbanisation was conducive to class formation in that 
larger and more stable communities and workplaces provided more 
fertile ground for class-based patterns of association, identification 
and solidarity. Belich describes the early part of the twentieth 
century as ’the making of the New Zealand working class’.25 This 
period saw increasing levels of unionisation and strike action – 
including significant confrontations between capital and labour in 
the Blackball miners’ strike of 1908, the Waihi miners’ strike of 
1912 and the general strike of 1913. The formation of the Federation 
of Labour in 1909 and the Labour Party in 1916 expressed this 
growing consciousness and a desire for national organisation and 
advancement of working-class interests. The unrest reflected the 
fact that workers didn’t share equally in the benefits of the long 
boom at the start of the century when wage growth was constrained 
while farmers, merchants and speculators prospered. And when 
the economy began to falter during the 1920s and eventually 
foundered in the Great Depression at the end of the decade, 
working people bore the brunt of the extreme unemployment 
and hardship that followed.26 But again the interests of working 
people were instrumental in the election of a reforming government 
which would usher in a different model of capitalism and another 
era of prosperity – this time one that was more widely shared. 
Compromise: 1935–1984 
The first Labour government, like the Liberals in the 1890s, came 
to power during a major crisis in capitalism and set about a reform 
programme which sought to address class-based inequalities 
and steer a new course of economic development. Its solution 
resembled those adopted in other developed capitalist economies 
in the wake of the Depression and later the Second World War. 
Labour was more of a working-class party than the Liberals, but 
it sought a class compromise rather than a socialist alternative – 
24  Erik Olssen and Maureen Hickey, Class and Occupation, Dunedin 
2005, pp. 91–115; David Pearson and David Thorns, Eclipse of Equality, 
Sydney 1983, pp. 39–47.
25  James Belich, Paradise Reforged, Auckland 2001, pp. 133–146.
26  Brooking, ‘Economic Transformation’.
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a fairer form of capitalism with a broader economic base, a more 
equitable distribution of income and a more beneficent state. The 
labour movement forsook militancy in return for wage growth, full 
employment and expanding social welfare; capital forsook a degree 
of commercial freedom and profit in return for a more compliant 
workforce and more affluent consumers; and the state maintained 
the compromise through interventionist economic management, 
centralised wage bargaining and social expenditure.27 The benefits 
of the compromise could only be realised through diversification 
of the economy – while agriculture continued to dominate the 
export trade, industrialisation was required in order to stimulate 
domestic production and employment. This was achieved through 
a combination of import controls and demand management 
policies which encouraged manufacturing of import substitutes 
for expanding domestic markets.28 Consequently, secondary-sector 
employment grew rapidly in the two decades after the Second 
World War, also stimulating considerable growth in producer and 
consumer service industries, while the public sector expanded 
to meet its increased role in economic management and social 
development. 
Structural economic changes also entailed shifts in the 
class structure. Within the capitalist class industrial capital, which 
had previously been subordinate to agrarian interests, assumed 
more power due to its critical role in the new economic model. The 
ranks of the capitalists also included growing numbers of executives 
and directors who controlled, rather than owned, the means of 
production, due to the growth of publicly-owned companies and 
other large businesses run by managers rather than owners. This 
also involved expansion in lower managerial employment which, 
along with continuing growth in the professions, bolstered the 
ranks of the ‘new middle class’. Meanwhile the ‘old middle class’ 
of petty-commodity producers dwindled as capital became more 
concentrated and large businesses took increasing market shares. 
But perhaps the most significant consequence of industrialisation 
was the emergence for the first time of a significantly sized and 
27  Bruce Jesson, Fragments of Labour, Auckland 1989, pp. 14–21.
28  Gary Hawke, ‘Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 1938–1992’, in 
Geoffrey Rice, ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., Auckland 
1992.
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relatively powerful industrial working class. And the ranks of the 
working class were also joined by growing numbers of routine white-
collar workers involved in the increasingly complex administration 
of production, services and government. 
All this was accompanied by significant demographic 
change in the urban working class as excess demand for labour 
in secondary industries resulted in large-scale labour migrations 
of Māori from rural New Zealand and people from Pacific island 
nations, as well as increases in immigration from Britain and 
Europe. Labour force participation among women was also 
increasing – mainly in lower professional, clerical and retailing 
work but also in manufacturing. Class divisions were therefore 
becoming increasingly complicated by the intersecting divisions 
of ethnicity and gender. This may have inhibited the development 
of class consciousness and class formation, but on the other hand 
the increasing concentration of workers in larger workplaces – 
particularly industrial plants – along with compulsory unionism 
and industry-level collective bargaining meant this was a period 
when the collective power of labour was perhaps stronger than at 
any other time in New Zealand’s history. 
The path set by the Labour government in the 1930s was 
followed by both Labour and National governments in the post-
War years up until the 1970s, and for most of that period provided 
steady economic growth, full employment and rising incomes – 
helped by favourable international conditions.29 That changed in 
the early 1970s with the onset of another global economic crisis 
and deterioration in New Zealand’s export markets. Domestically 
the class compromise collapsed as capital sought to constrain wage 
growth in the face of declining profitability, and organised labour 
responded with increasing industrial action. The 1970s saw the end 
of full employment and real wage growth, along with plummeting 
growth rates and rising public debt. The National government 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s pursued highly interventionist 
strategies in attempting to manage and spend its way out of the 
crisis, but its failure set the scene for the neoliberal revolution 
which was to follow. 
29  Brian Roper, Prosperity for All?, Southbank 2005, pp. 121–137.
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The present: class in the age of neoliberalism
Capital strikes back
The neoliberal project, both here and overseas, is often portrayed 
as a reassertion of the power and privilege of the capitalist class 
in reaction to the strength of organised labour and the gains 
achieved in working conditions, wages and welfare during the post-
War decades.30 Whether or not this was the intention, it certainly 
favoured the interests of capital over those of labour. Internationally, 
the neoliberal prescription for reviving an ailing global capitalism 
was the liberalisation of flows of trade and finance, and this meant 
the viability of national economies depended on being globally 
competitive, which was seen to require prioritising the interests 
of capital. Within these parameters there was some variation in 
the models adopted by different nation states, but New Zealand 
opted for a strongly market-oriented model similar to those already 
being implemented in the USA and UK.31 This meant the role of 
the state shifted from interventionist economic management to 
providing conditions for the efficient operation of markets, in which 
businesses competed locally and globally through innovation and 
efficiency – a key part of which was reducing labour costs. It also 
meant abandoning the protected mass production industries that 
had sustained the previous growth model, in favour of more flexible 
and specialised production, along with producer and consumer 
services, and speculation in property and finance. 
In New Zealand we had the paradoxical situation of 
the free-market neoliberal project being initiated by what was 
supposedly the party of workers (Labour) in reaction to the 
failed interventionist policies of what was supposedly the party 
of business (National). The Labour government was not itself 
motivated by the interests of capital but was reacting to an 
economic crisis which required a radical response, and allowed its 
strategy to be driven by increasingly militant business interests 
30  David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford 2005; Roper, 
Prosperity for All?
31  Robert Boyer, ‘How and Why Capitalisms Differ’, Economy and Society 
34/4 2005, pp. 509–57.
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and like-minded bureaucrats in key government agencies.32 
The main elements of the reforms are by now very familiar: 
deregulation of product and capital markets to enable freer flows 
of commodities and finance; reform of the state sector through 
corporatisation, privatisation and restructuring; tight monetary 
policy focussed exclusively on inflation control; restraints on 
government spending and corresponding reductions in taxation; 
and labour market deregulation to encourage flexibility and 
individualisation of employment relationships.33 Labour’s residual 
allegiance to its working-class constituency at least deterred it 
from radical labour market and welfare reforms, but these key 
elements of the neoliberal agenda were pursued with alacrity by 
the National government which succeeded it in 1990. Subsequently 
the Clark Labour government made some regulatory and social 
policy adjustments in an effort to mitigate some of the iniquities of 
earlier reforms, but left the fundamentals of the neoliberal model 
firmly intact. More recently, the Key National government has 
pursued an unequivocally neoliberal agenda including further cuts 
to welfare provisions and worker protections. The global financial 
crisis exposed the failings of the neoliberal model, in particular the 
consequences of financial deregulation and income inequality, but 
governments have been reluctant to seriously address these issues 
and neoliberalism remains firmly embedded, in New Zealand as 
elsewhere.34 
While the neoliberal project generally benefitted capital, it 
had contrasting effects on the productive and financial sectors. In 
the productive sectors, farmers lost much of their state assistance, 
while manufacturers lost most of their import protections and 
export incentives. In combination with rising interest rates and 
contracting domestic markets, this resulted in many farm sales, 
business closures and redundancies early in the restructuring 
period. Subsequent rationalisation of agriculture and refocussing of 
manufacturing on niche export markets has allowed some producers 
to prosper, but they remain far more exposed to global competition 
32  Jesson, Fragments of Labour.
33  Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment, Auckland 1995.
34  Jane Kelsey, The FIRE Economy, Wellington 2015; Brian Roper, ‘The 
Fifth (Key) National Government’s Neoliberal Policy Agenda’, New Zealand 
Sociology 26/1 2011, pp. 12–40.
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and market fluctuations than they were before liberalisation. By 
comparison, liberalisation was very beneficial to the financial sector 
which was comprehensively deregulated early in the piece, freeing 
up the movement of capital and integrating New Zealand into global 
financial markets. The formidable profits to be made from ‘casino 
capitalism’ at a time when productive industries were struggling 
for profitability saw investment being diverted from production to 
speculation and the emergence of what has been called “the FIRE 
economy” – built on finance, insurance and real estate.35 While this 
has greatly enriched a few, it has not enhanced the wellbeing of 
most, doing little to stimulate production and employment, while 
increasing inequality and instability.  
Similarly, while neoliberalism has generally had adverse 
effects on labour, this has not been universal: many workers 
have experienced loss of employment, job security and income – 
particularly the low-skilled – while others with more marketable 
skills and stronger bargaining positions have fared relatively well. 
Competitive pressures to reduce labour costs and utilise labour 
more flexibly resulted in fundamental revision of the relationship 
between capital and labour by means of the Employment Contracts 
Act and its slightly watered-down replacement, the Employment 
Relations Act. This encouraged individualisation of employment 
relations and gave employers greater flexibility in how they 
engaged and remunerated workers, weakening the collective 
organisation and bargaining power of workers, and constraining 
wages and conditions.36 This had especially severe consequences for 
the most vulnerable workers – the low-skilled, the casual workers, 
those in small and non-unionised workplaces – in a market where 
the supply of low-skilled labour greatly exceeded demand. It was 
not so much the case for skilled workers, particularly those who 
could command a premium for scarce professional and technical 
expertise. Therefore, in addition to redistribution of income from 
labour to capital, there was also redistribution of income among 
workers, from the less-skilled to the more highly skilled. Moreover, 
the upwards redistribution of income was accentuated by a fiscal 
policy of reducing government spending in favour of a lower and 
35  Kelsey, The FIRE Economy.
36  The Employment Relations Amendment Act 2014 has recently 
introduced further deterrents to collective bargaining and industrial action. 
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flatter taxation regime, meaning less money was redistributed 
to low-income earners through social expenditure, and more 
retained by businesses and high-income earners through tax cuts. 
Additionally, monetary policy which prioritised price stability over 
employment resulted in high interest rates which ensured good 
returns for those with financial assets at a time when wages were 
being restrained. Consequently, New Zealand experienced one of 
the most rapid increases in inequality in the developed capitalist 
world in the early years of the neoliberal regime, the legacy of 
which persists today.37
Restructuring class
There have been some significant shifts in class structure during 
the neoliberal period. These are partly a continuation of long-
term movements from working-class to middle-class employment 
(particularly the professions and management), and shifts within 
the working class from blue-collar to routine white-collar and 
service work. These longstanding trends reflect the fact that 
expansion in material production tends to generate even greater 
expansion in the division of labour surrounding production – the 
work of managers, experts, clerks, salespeople and so on – as 
well as the fact that within production technological change 
increasingly replaces human labour with machinery. Even as New 
Zealand industrialised after the Second World War, the majority 
of job growth was actually in service industries and white-collar 
work. Long-term trends can also be accentuated or disrupted by 
episodes of economic restructuring, when the sectoral distribution 
of production and the nature of production processes change, often 
in concert with new technological developments. This was certainly 
the case with the neoliberal restructuring project which removed 
support for mass production industries in favour of financial and 
service industries and less labour intensive manufacturing – with 
information technologies being instrumental in the development of 
new products and production processes. In terms of employment, 
this was a process of creative destruction: it destroyed vast numbers 
of jobs in production industries, particularly among semi-skilled 
37  Max Rashbrooke, ‘Inequality and New Zealand’, in Rashbrooke, ed., 
Inequality; Kelsey, The FIRE Economy, pp. 86–94; Bryan Perry, ‘Household 
Incomes in New Zealand’, Ministry of Social Development 2015.
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and routine manual workers, while subsequent job creation was 
concentrated in different sectors and in different kinds of jobs – 
predominantly in producer and consumer service industries and in 
professional and managerial occupations as well as routine white-
collar and service jobs.38 
The effects on class structure between 1986 and 2013 
can be seen in Figure 1.39 This is a distribution of the employed 
population by structural class location and, as per the earlier 
discussion on Wright’s class model, it makes no assumptions about 
the degree of class formation among these categories. Because it 
excludes those with a marginal attachment to the workforce – the 
unemployed and other jobless workers – it may also understate the 
number of people with an attachment to working-class locations. 
The number of people in capitalist class locations (including 
both owners and higher executives) is very small and although 
they may have increased their power and share of income over the 
period, their numbers did not increase greatly. By contrast there 
was significant growth in middle-class employment, increasing 
from less than a third to almost half of the workforce between 1986 
and 2013. Both the professional and managerial fractions of the 
middle class grew considerably, while working proprietors declined, 
accentuating the long-term trend within the middle class towards 
the professions and management. Professionals accounted for by 
far the largest share of middle-class employment by 2013 and 
within this group there was also upward movement, with faster 
growth rates in higher professional fields such as information 
technology, management consultancy, medicine, tertiary teaching, 
law and accountancy. Similarly there was an upward trend among 
managers, from operational to corporate management roles in fields 
such as finance, human resources, marketing and communications. 
So not only did middle-class growth indicate increasing skill levels 
within the workforce as a whole, but the middle class itself was 
38  Ongley, ‘Reshaping the Division of Labour’, pp. 103–129.
39  This is based on a reclassification of Census data on occupation and 
employment status. Like Wright’s class model it uses classificatory criteria 
of ownership, authority and skills, but the categories are somewhat 
modified. For a more detailed explanation see Ongley, ‘Reshaping the 
Division of Labour’, pp. 144–155, 235–237.
becoming more skilled.
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The converse of middle-class growth was a decline in the 
relative size of the workforce in working-class jobs. While the shift 
from working-class to middle-class employment has been a long-
term historical trend, it was greatly accentuated in this period by 
the devastating effects of restructuring on production industries 
and therefore on blue-collar production jobs. As the economy 
recovered there was some growth in working-class employment 
but at a relatively modest rate and more in service industries than 
production industries. The more recent job losses resulting from 
the global financial crisis were also disproportionately in working-
class jobs, particularly in construction and retailing. Figure 1 
shows that over the full period the greatest decline in working-class 
employment was in semi-skilled jobs, a category which includes 
many of the plant-operating and assembly jobs which were most 
severely affected by the demise of manufacturing. Routine work 
– which includes many low-skilled service jobs – held up more 
strongly initially and despite a subsequent fall now makes up the 
largest proportion of working-class employment. 
This has also involved a shift from blue to grey-collar jobs, 
as shown in Figure 2. Grey-collar jobs are those which don’t fit into 
the traditional blue and white-collar categories, mostly low-skilled 
service work in occupations such as cleaning, caregiving, and fast-
food and restaurant work. This has been by far the fastest growing 
area of working-class employment since the 1980s, mirroring the 
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decline in blue-collar production work. While blue-collar work may 
represent the traditional image of working-class employment, it 
now accounts for just over a third of working-class jobs. White-
collar occupations – mostly clerical and sales jobs – also account 
for about a third, as they did in the 1980s. The trend towards 
routine and grey-collar jobs in the working class has probably also 
involved a deterioration in the quality of employment as these 
types of work tend to have inferior conditions of employment, 
including lower pay, less regular hours and less job security. 
Many of these jobs could be classed as precarious work, and the 
increase in this type of employment in capitalist economies under 
neoliberalism has led some to suggest the emergence of a new class 
dubbed ‘the precariat’.40 This is questionable for both empirical and 
conceptual reasons – empirically because it tends to overstate the 
growth in genuinely precarious work; and conceptually because 
people in this kind of work are not distinct from the working class 
but share similar positions in production relations and similar 
material interests.41 Nevertheless, in New Zealand as in other 
market-oriented economies there are significant numbers of highly 
exploited and vulnerable workers whose situation owes much to 
the drive to cut labour costs and improve flexibility in deregulated 
labour markets.42 
  
40  Guy Standing, The Precariat, London 2011; Mike Savage, Social Class 
in the 21st Century, London 2015.
41  On empirical evidence for precarity see Kevin Doogan, The New 
Capitalism? Cambridge 2009; on the precariat as a class see Jan Breman, 
‘A Bogus Concept?’, New Left Review 84 2013, pp. 130–38; Erik Olin 
Wright, Understanding Class, pp. 157–173.
42  New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, ‘Under Pressure’, Wellington 
2013.
So overall there has been something of a divergence of 
employment in the neoliberal era: an upward shift from working-
class to middle-class employment has been accompanied by upward 
movement within the middle class and downward movement 
within the working class. This is likely to have contributed to the 
growth of income inequality, although it is difficult to quantify this. 
While working-class employment has been declining and changing 
in character, it is far from endangered. By 2013 half the workforce 
were still in jobs that could be objectively categorised as working 
class in that they lacked ownership of the means of production and 
the advantages of  managerial and professional positions. If we 
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were able to categorise marginally attached workers on the basis 
of their previous jobs or skills, we would probably find that the 
proportion of people in working-class locations was still greater. 
Whether all people in such positions would identify themselves as 
working class, however, is quite another matter.
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Class formation
Paradoxically, while the neoliberal period has seen an accentuation 
of class inequalities, it has probably also seen a diminishing of 
class consciousness and the potential for class formation within 
the working class. Shifts away from blue-collar employment, 
individualisation of employment relations, and increasing gender 
and ethnic diversity within working-class employment all tend to 
weaken collective ties and possibilities for collective action.
 
Structural shifts within working-class employment have 
been towards jobs which tend to provide a weaker basis for class 
formation. Blue-collar jobs, particularly manual production work 
in large enterprises, have traditionally been the most likely to 
foster a collective orientation and higher rates of unionisation and 
industrial action. White-collar or grey-collar jobs are often based in 
smaller workplaces, with less stable workforces and less opportunity 
for collective organisation. A lingering status distinction between 
96 Counterfutures 1
blue and white-collar jobs also means some who work in offices and 
shops may be inclined to differentiate themselves from those who 
work in factories and on building sites, even if they are materially 
no better off and their work is just as routinised (possibly more 
so). Additionally, some lower-skilled white-collar and grey-collar 
jobs tend to attract people in transitional employment – such as 
students, new entrants to the workforce, recent immigrants or 
semi-retired people – who only intend to work in those jobs for short 
periods and have aspirations or backgrounds which may be more 
middle class than working class. 
Structural changes have been compounded by institutional 
changes undermining collective organisation and action by workers. 
Employment relations reforms have been specifically designed to 
individualise relationships between workers and their employers, 
in the process discouraging unionisation, collective bargaining and 
industrial action. They had the desired effect, resulting in huge 
falls in union membership and work stoppages which, as noted 
earlier, have tipped the balance in the capital–labour relation 
further in favour of capital.43 But additionally the individualisation 
of that relationship diminishes the sense of collective awareness 
and affiliation among workers that is central to the process of class 
formation.
That process has also been complicated by growing 
gender and ethnic diversity. The workforce as a whole has become 
increasingly diverse in this period, something which has been 
particularly pronounced in working-class employment. In terms 
of gender, women’s labour force participation rates have risen 
significantly as those with children have increasingly combined 
paid employment with raising families. Women are represented 
throughout the class structure and have made marked inroads into 
managerial and higher professional employment – although within 
these fields they remain under-represented in the top positions and 
43  By 2014 just 19 percent of employees belonged to registered trade 
unions (New Zealand Companies Office, Union Membership Return Report, 
2014), and there were just 13 work stoppages, with fewer than 1,500 
person-days of work lost (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, 
Annual Work Stoppage Statistics, 2014).  
97Ongley: Class
earn less on average.44 But the structural shifts within working-
class employment have also been gendered shifts, as the declining 
blue-collar jobs tend to be male dominated, while grey and white-
collar jobs tend to have a much stronger female representation and 
in many cases are female dominated. Meanwhile ethnic diversity 
has increased as a result of relatively fast growth rates in the 
Māori and Pacific working-age populations and the liberalisation 
of immigration policy in the 1980s and 1990s, which increased and 
diversified migration flows. Māori and Pacific workers have been 
disproportionately concentrated in working-class jobs – particularly 
blue and grey-collar occupations – since the post-War labour 
migrations and, despite increasing social mobility among younger 
generations, cycles of inter-generational disadvantage have meant 
they remain over-represented in those types of jobs. And although 
immigration policy is ostensibly oriented towards attracting skilled 
workers, many lower-skilled migrants arrive through family, 
humanitarian and temporary migration streams, while even the 
more highly qualified may find themselves working in lower-skilled 
jobs at least for a period after arrival. 
The division of classes by gender and ethnicity is not 
just a demographic matter but also a social and political one, as 
gender and ethnic differences have become more focal in terms of 
identity and mobilisation around issues of equity and social justice. 
These issues cut across class boundaries and have gained more 
prominence at a time when class consciousness and mobilisation 
have been on the wane, so may further weaken the bonds of class 
and the salience of class identities and politics. But this does not 
mean that the material inequalities of class are any less significant.
44  Statistics New Zealand, ‘Women at Work: 1991–2013’, Wellington 
2015.
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The future: class beyond neoliberalism
We may currently be at something of a crossroads in the history of 
capitalism, which could alter the course of its development and have 
important ramifications for class structures and class relations. 
Major crises within capitalism have historically been followed 
by periods of restructuring and reform which change the nature 
of production and the institutional forms governing relations of 
production. As we have seen, this was the case in New Zealand (as 
elsewhere in the capitalist world) following the Long Depression of 
the 1880s, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the crisis of the 
1970s. The recent global financial crisis was a comparable event, 
but as yet it has not precipitated the end of neoliberalism nor even 
forced significant change to that model. This is not to say that it 
won’t happen. New models of capitalism can take many years to 
emerge after a crisis, as was the case with the neoliberal model. And 
although it has now been eight years since the start of the global 
financial crisis, most capitalist economies including New Zealand’s 
remain in a precarious state, with modest and unstable growth, 
high levels of public and household debt, persisting joblessness and 
inequality, continued exposure to the vagaries of global financial 
markets, and the threat of potentially destabilising crises in 
Europe and Asia. A further crisis, or even a failure to reinvigorate 
capitalism by current means, could yet prompt more radical efforts 
to forge a new economic model. Given capitalism’s remarkable 
history of reinventing itself – and barring a complete collapse in the 
global economy – any transformation is likely to bring about a new 
variant of capitalism rather than a post-capitalist alternative. But 
what shape that might take remains for now entirely conjectural.
 
As the future of class is inextricably bound up with the 
future of capitalism, that too is a matter of conjecture. One thing 
we can be sure of is that class has a future for as long as capitalism 
has a future. As argued earlier, class is an inherent feature of the 
capitalist mode of production, and continues to have real effects 
on people’s lives and the nature of capitalist societies. Contrary 
to the arguments of those who claim that class is dead or dying, 
it remains very much alive: the entrenchment of neoliberalism 
despite its culpability for the global financial crisis has been an 
entrenchment of the power and privilege of capital at the expense 
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of labour; and the increasing awareness of and opposition to the 
material inequalities this entails represents a challenge to that 
order and a potential reassertion of the interests of labour. Even 
though the language of class tends to be absent from much of the 
discourse, the underlying issues are essentially class issues. 
Despite the uncertainty of the present moment and the 
inevitable pitfalls of predicting future developments, we can consider 
three broad scenarios for the future of capitalism and capitalist 
class relations. The first is the persistence of a neoliberal model 
which serves the interests of capital at the expense of labour; the 
second is a return to a less pernicious form of capitalism involving 
a class compromise; and the third is a more radical transformation 
to a post-capitalist economy involving a more fundamental revision 
of class relations. These are scenarios which are not necessarily 
specific to the New Zealand situation but apply to developed 
capitalist societies more generally – and in a competitive global 
economy New Zealand’s options are likely to be constrained and 
shaped by developments in larger economies such as the USA and 
UK. 
Further entrenchment of neoliberalism is likely to see 
a continuation of current structural trends and imbalances in 
class relations: further polarisation between an increasingly 
skilled and well remunerated middle class, and a working class 
increasingly dominated by service workers in low-skilled, low-paid 
and often precarious employment; and continued dominance of 
capital over workers who have limited opportunities for collective 
organisation and whose wages and conditions are restrained in 
the interests of cutting production costs and containing inflation. 
And if the arguments of Piketty’s Capital are correct, we may see 
further concentration of capital and inherited wealth, which could 
further entrench intergenerational inequality and rigidify class 
boundaries.45 Ultimately, this model may contain the seeds of its 
own destruction, both politically and economically. Politically, the 
unrest seen in the wake of the global financial crisis, manifested 
most visibly in the Occupy movement but also in the broader tide 
of concern about inequality, could develop into a more broadly 
45  Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge MA, 
2014.
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based and concerted opposition to neoliberal capitalism. And 
economically, this model will continue to encourage financial and 
property speculation by those with money and growing debt among 
those without, risking a repeat of the global financial crisis, perhaps 
on an even more cataclysmic scale. 
If the neoliberal model is either rejected democratically or 
collapses from within, we could see some form of class compromise 
as occurred after the depressions of the 1880s and 1930s. The form 
this takes would obviously be very different from those times and 
would be determined by the contestation of class interests. However, 
in very broad terms we could envisage an alternative to the “FIRE 
economy” based not on speculation but on the production of high-
value commodities in the form of both goods and services for both 
global and domestic markets. An economy in which workers are 
viewed not as costs of production to be minimised in the interests 
of profitability, but as citizens deserving of decent work and decent 
incomes, and as consumers whose spending stimulates production 
rather than speculation. Under these conditions we would probably 
continue to see expansion and upskilling of the middle class, but 
within the working class we might see better quality employment 
including a reversal of the trend towards lower-skilled and insecure 
service work, in favour of more skilled work in both manual and 
non-manual occupations. Crucially, we might also see some 
redressing of the imbalances in capital–labour relations, including 
greater rights and opportunities for workers to organise collectively 
in pursuit of their interests, and institutional reforms prioritising 
the wellbeing of people over the unfettered pursuit of profit.
This would not spell an end to capitalist class relations, 
merely a shift to a fairer form of capitalism. There remains the 
possibility of a more radical transition to a post-capitalist future in 
which capitalist class relations are superseded by alternative forms 
of production relations. Ideas about what shape such a future might 
take and strategies for achieving it are of course highly contested, 
but arguably it is more likely to come about through evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary transformation. Just as capitalist 
relations of production emerged within and co-existed with the 
feudal mode of production before becoming dominant, so we could 
see a transitional shift towards non-capitalist forms of production 
which are already emergent within capitalism. Alternatives 
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such as worker co-operatives, social enterprises, community-
based production and collaborative peer production networks 
offer economic models in which productive resources are held 
collectively rather than exclusively, where production is managed 
democratically rather than hierarchically, and in which the fruits 
of collective labour are shared rather than appropriated. While 
such models still account for a relatively small share of overall 
economic activity, they are becoming more viable as technological 
change stimulates information-based production and collaborative 
networking, and they may gain momentum from disaffection with 
capitalism’s current path of recurring crises, economic insecurity, 
social polarisation and environmental destruction. Such shifts 
could in time progress to a point where the capital–labour relation 
no longer provides the defining characteristic or guiding logic of the 
economic system – a post-capitalist and post-class future.46 For now 
this may seem a distant prospect, but given capitalism’s current ills 
it is not unimaginable. 
46  Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, London 2010; Paul 
Mason, PostCapitalism, London 2015.
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